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In this thesis, I examine the relationship between national immigration policy changes and  
its effect on public opinion towards immigration in Austria and Sweden. Previous literature 
had mainly focused on the impact of public opinion on policy changes while the reverse 
relationship has not been examined to the same degree. The empirical background and 
starting point of the thesis is the so-called migration or refugee crisis which had its onset in 
the second half of 2015. As immigration became more salient due to the crisis, I am going  
to examine policy changes and public opinion from the end of 2010 until the end of 2016 
using the comparative case study approach and qualitative content analysis. The result is that 
there is a connection between the restrictive policy changes and public attitudes towards 
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1. Introduction and Research Puzzle  
Even though there has always been migration to Europe and the European Union, the issue 
gained significantly in salience when there was a large and sudden influx in people fleeing to 
Europe from war-torn countries such as Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq (European Parliament, 
2017a; Börzel and Risse, 2018, p. 84). In order to deal with the migration wave, European 
countries as well as the European Union as a whole implemented several new migration 
policies and amended existing ones. Furthermore, the media started to report extensively on 
the causes and effects this so-called migration crisis, which likely lead to a perceived 
increase of the saliency of immigration.  
Due to the influx in immigration to Europe, the increased salience and the response of the 
national European governments to it, is it likely that the public opinion towards immigrants 
has also changed. However, it has not yet been examined what the effect of the policy 
changes on the public’s perception of immigration and immigrants is and whether this effect 
increased due to the increase in saliency. Yet, most research has focused on the effect of 
public opinion on policies, but it is equally important to investigate the effects policies have 
on the public’s opinions and attitudes.  
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the migration policy changes 
implemented by the Austrian and Swedish governments, after the onset of the so-called 
migration crisis, impacted the public opinions of Austrians and Swedes towards migration. 
This means, would more restricting policy changes lead to less favorable views and attitudes 
towards migrants and migration while less restricting policy changes would lead to a more 
favorable public opinion towards migration and migrants. Furthermore, the thesis aims to see 
if the increased issue salience of migration led to a stronger influence of the policy changes 
on the public’s opinion than previous migration policy changes. From this research aim,  
I derive the following research questions. Have the public opinions towards migration in 
Austria and Sweden changed after the onset of the so-called migration crisis? Do these 
changes in public attitudes correspond to the migration policy changes the governments 
implemented after the onset of the crisis (more restrictive versus less restrictive)? Is the 
impact of the migration policy changes on the public opinion stronger after the beginning of 
the so-called migration crisis than before when the issue salience of migration was lower?  
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In order to better understand the effect the crisis had on Europe, one has to first define the 
terms refugee, migrant and asylum-seeker. The European Union defines an immigrant as 
someone who “establishes their usual residence in the territory of an EU/EFTA Member 
State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been 
usually resident in another EU/EFTA Member State or a third country” (Migration and 
Home Affairs, 2018b). A refugee is someone who “is outside the country of nationality and 
is unable or, owning to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that 
country” out of fear of persecution due to several factors (Migration and Home Affairs, 
2018c). The last term that needs to be defined is asylum seeker, who is someone that “has 
made an application for protection under the Geneva Refugee Convention and Protocol in 
respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken” (Migration and Home Affairs, 
2018a).  
So, to answer my research questions, I will proceed as follows. First, I am going to discuss 
the so-called migration crisis and how it relates to a rise of anti-immigrant policies and 
parties in the European Union in general as well as Austria and Sweden specifically. Then,  
I am going to review the previous literature and research on the relationship between public 
opinion and policy changes. Afterwards, I will introduce the case study approach as well as 
the qualitative content analysis as the methodological foundation of my analysis and show 
why it is suitable to answer my research questions. Following this, I will conduct my 
analysis of Austria and Sweden before coming to a conclusion for my thesis.  
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2. The Migration Crisis  
Between 2014 and 2015, the number of asylum seekers doubled from 625,000 (Eurostat, 
2015, p. 4) to more than 1.2 million (Eurostat, 2017).The considerable increase in people 
who arrived in the EU exposed shortcomings in the EU’s asylum system (European Parlia-
ment, 2017a, 2017b). Which is why some scholars claim that the crisis is rather a crisis of 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) than a refugee or migration crisis (Niemann 
and Zaun, 2018, p. 3). Especially a reform of the Dublin regulation, which regulates that  
the EU member state an asylum applicant first enters the EU is responsible for processing 
the claim, has been called for (European Parliament, 2017b). This practice led to an  
unequal burden sharing amongst EU member states with countries on the border of the 
Schengen area, such as Italy or Greece, being disproportionally affected” (European 
Parliament, 2017b).  
Despite many calls for a reform of the Dublin regulation, the Dublin III agreement from 
2013 (European Union, 2013) is still in place as the EU member states could not agree on the 
proposed amendments (European Commission). The lack of cooperation and burden-sharing 
amongst the EU member states regarding asylum seekers is causing problems to this day, 
causing tensions within the European Union. The discussions about whether private ships 
should engage in civil sea rescue and whether countries are obliged to take these ships in are 
illustrating these rifts and undermine the importance of a Dublin agreement reform (Becker 
et al., 2019). 
 
2.1 Rise in Anti-immigrant Policies  
The measures undertaken by the European Union to handle the crisis can be categorized into 
an internal as well as an external dimension. These dimensions refer to whether the policies 
focus on changes within or between EU-member states (internal) or whether the policies and 
measures undertaken also impacted other countries that are not a member of the European 
Union, such as the EU-Turkey deal (external dimension) (Niemann and Zaun, 2018).  
On the internal dimension, the EU implemented the so-called ‘hotspot approach’ (Niemann 
and Zaun, 2018, p. 5) which is aimed at supporting member states with tasks such as 
“registration, identification, finger-printing and debriefing of asylum-seekers, as well as  
with return operations” (Niemann and Zaun, 2018, p. 6). Another EU-internal approach at 
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alleviating the effects of the crisis relied on the relocation and resettlement of asylum-
seekers within the EU. However, this scheme failed, largely due to the resistance of the 
Visegrad countries (Niemann and Zaun, 2018, p. 7; Trauner, 2016, p. 320). 
On the external dimension, the European Union tried to tackle its “worst refugee crisis since 
the end of World War II” (European Parliament, 2017a), through reforming and expanding 
its border agency Frontex in October of 2016 (Niemann and Zaun, 2018). With this reform, 
the agency was officially renamed European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex, 
2019) and it is aiming to reinforce “the management and security of the EU’s external 
borders” (European Parliament, 2017b). In addition, the EU reformed its European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) and transformed it into the EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA) 
(Fernández Rojo, 2018). Through this, the EU was able to strengthen and tighten its border 
controls as well as “improving the ability of member states to track people entering Europe” 
(European Parliament, 2017b). 
Besides reforming and strengthening EU agencies tasked with border security and the 
supervision of refugees and migrants coming to Europe is the European Union working on 
increasing the efficiency of its return policy (European Parliament, 2017b). In addition to 
these more structural responses to the migrant crisis, there are also more concrete policy 
examples of how the EU tries to manage the large migration flow. One very prominent 
policy change on the external dimension is the EU-Turkey deal that got adopted on the 18th 
of March 2016 (Niemann and Zaun, 2018, p. 8). With this deal, Turkey agreed to take in all 
refugees and migrants that entered Greece through Turkey (Weber, 2017, p. 7). The intention 
of this deal was to substantially decrease the amount of irregular migration towards the EU. 
For every Syrian that was sent back to Turkey, the EU agreed to resettle one Syrian refugee 
from Turkey (Cremer, 2017). Turkey conceded to this arrangement because the country 
would receive 3 billion Euros for handling the refugees in Turkey (Weber, 2017, p. 8). 
Furthermore, the EU promised to later voluntarily resettle more refugees from Turkey, as 
well as working on speeding up the EU accession process (Weber, 2017, p. 8). On top of  
that did the EU categorize Turkey and several other countries as safe countries of origin 
(Niemann and Zaun, 2018, pp. 9–10). The intended outcome of this policy change, that 
affects both the external and internal dimension, is to advance and reduce the number of 
asylum applications from these countries (Niemann and Zaun, 2018, p. 10).  
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Yet, as not all countries of the European Union were affected in the same way by the crisis, 
there was also a considerable difference in how the EU member states responded to the 
refugee crisis. Initially, the EU’s reaction to the crisis was “led by Germany and a coalition 
of member states willing to take in the refugees and migrants” (Weber, 2017, p. 7), whereas 
countries such as Hungary and the other Visegrad states (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the 
Czech Republic) were not as welcoming to the refugees (Trauner, 2016, p. 320). Especially 
Hungary became known for its poor treatment of asylum seekers (Niemann and Zaun, 2018, 
p. 4). Due to Hungary’s location on the border of the Schengen area, the country initially 
received large amounts of asylum seekers but eventually erected a fence on its border which 
shifted migration flows away from its territory (Trauner, 2016, p. 320). This disobedience to 
EU-norms had a ripple effect and ultimately led to other EU governments giving in to 
domestic populist pressures and become stricter in their asylum and migration policies 
(Weber, 2017, p. 7).  
 
2.2 Rise in Anti-immigrant Parties 
Overall, the measures taken by the European Union are oftentimes designed to reduce the 
number of immigrants coming to the European Union. However, the inability to find a 
solution for the distribution of asylum-seekers across the EU member states, has affected 
other areas as well. For instance, the sudden increase in asylum-seekers and the ensuing 
media attention also correlated with a surge in popularity for right-wing and populist parties 
that are anti-immigrant in their rhetoric and proposed policies (Cook, 2019). This content 
helped these parties to gain significant success, not only in national elections, but also in the 
European Parliament (EP) elections. The composition of the EP has drastically changed 
since the elections in 2009 and 2014 with right-wing and populist parties gaining more  
and more votes as well as forming their own political groups in the European Parliament 
(Weise, 2019; Cook, 2019). These populist parties especially gained influence in top-
recipient countries such as Austria, Germany and Sweden (Niemann and Zaun, 2018, p. 13). 
Though Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is a new party quickly discovered 
anti-immigrant rhetoric for their advantage (Lees, 2018), the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (FPÖ), or the Swedish Sverigedemokraterna or Sweden Democrats (SD) have 
existed for decades and have been part of the European parliament and their respective 
national parliaments before the onset of the crisis (European Parliament, 2019).  
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However, the success of the FPÖ is remarkable as it became the coalition partner of the 
conservative Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) in the Austrian government from December 
2017 until May 2019 (Das Gupta, 2019). This showed how popular and mainstream anti-
immigrant positions have become in Austria. For instance, the FPÖ positioned itself for 
border controls in order to fight illegal migration and for restricting access to social welfare 
and subsidized housing for non-Austrians (FPÖ, 2017). Even though the Sweden Democrats 
are not in the Swedish government, they became the third biggest party after the national 
elections in 2018 with 17.53% compared to 12.86% in 2014 (Valmyndigheten, 2018).  
Their campaign also focused heavily on more restrictive migration policies 
(Sverigedemokraterna, 2018).  
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3. The Relationship between Public Opinion and Policy 
Changes 
In the following chapter, I will examine previous literature on the relationship between 
public opinion and policy changes. Furthermore, I will derive my theoretical expectations in 
the form of hypotheses regarding the causal impact of migration policy changes on public 
opinion. 
Over the years, there has been a lot of research conducted on the relationship between public 
opinion and policy changes. The focus there was especially on representative democracies, 
as the people elect representatives that are expected to execute their electorates will.  
This relationship works through the mechanisms of public responsiveness and policy 
representation (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010a, 2010b, p. 263). The latter refers to public 
preferences for policies being displayed in the government’s policies (Soroka and Wlezien, 
2010b, p. 263) whereas public responsiveness is the mechanism of an informed public 
reacting to policy (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010b, p. 263). This shows that the connection 
between policies and the public’s opinion is a reciprocal one (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010a, p. 
3). The informed public is expected to adjust to the policy changes and sending signals of 
content or discontent to the policy makers (Wlezien, 1995, p. 982). These two mechanisms 
have also been referred to as policy feedback (Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014, p. 3).  
However, one common model for explaining the relationship between policy changes  
and the public’s responsiveness towards them is the thermostatic model developed by 
Christopher Wlezien (1995). This model views the public as “a collection of individuals 
distributed along a dimension of preference for policy activity” (Wlezien, 1995, p. 982)  
to be higher or lower, akin to a thermostat. If the existing policy differs from the public’s 
preferences, the public would signal for a policy change (Wlezien, 1995, p. 982). When the 
policy adjusts sufficiently, the public’s signaling would stop (Wlezien, 1995, p. 982). The 
thermostatic model is based on the assumption of democratic accountability (Wlezien, 1995) 
where governments do react to public opinion also throughout the election cycle (Soroka  
and Wlezien, 2010a) meaning that a constant adjustment of policies and the public’s respon-
siveness is happening. However, the model has been mostly tested using data for the UK, 
Canada, and the USA due to their similar political systems (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010a). It 
is also important to mention that the focus of the thermostatic model is more on the public’s 
content or discontent of the policies itself instead of the impact the policy changes have on 
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public’s opinion towards the recipients of the policy changes: the migrants. Nonetheless, I 
expect there to be a similar mechanism in place for migration policies and public opinion 
towards migration. From this, I derive my first hypothesis: 
H1: Migration policy changes impact public opinion and attitudes towards migration 
and immigrants. 
The policy feedback approach on the other hand acknowledges that “attitudes and behaviour 
can be results of past policies” (Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014, p. 3). It is crucial to 
the policy feedback literature that preferences and attitudes of the (informed) public are 
actively shaped through policies (Hedegaard and Larsen, 2014, p. 269). This also fits the 
research conducted by Freeman (2006). He categorizes comparative immigration policy 
research into two general styles. The immigration policies are being shaped by general  
styles of public policy making as well as unique historical and situational experiences 
(Freeman, 2006, p. 227). Paul Pierson (1993) also sees policy feedback research as a part of 
a ‘historical institutionalist’ approach to comparative politics (Pierson, 1993, p. 596). He 
examines the different effects public policies can have on the public or politics. For instance, 
he argues that “public policies often create ‘spoils’ that provide a strong motivation for 
beneficiaries to mobilize in favor of programmatic maintenance or expansion” (Pierson, 
1993, p. 599). 
Victoria M. Esses, Leah K. Hamilton, and Danielle Gaucher (2017) examine possible 
determinants of public attitudes towards refugees. They show that within the research on 
perceived threat, the System Justification Theory theorizes that the public may perceive 
refugees “as a potential threat to the status quo because refugees’ cultural values and 
traditions can provoke social, political, and economic change” leading to initial negative 
attitudes towards them (Esses et al., 2017, p. 84). However, when for instance the media 
depicts refugees positively and the government starts to support refugees as well, the 
perceived threat refugees pose is reduced and the public’s attitudes are expected to improve 
(Esses et al., 2017, p. 84). This approach, in combination with the policy feedback approach 
leads to the derivation of the second hypothesis: 
H2: Migration policy changes that are less restrictive are likely to cause public 
attitudes towards migration and migrants to become more favorable. 
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Just as positive responses by the government to refugees are expected to lessen their 
perceived threat, negative responses by the government should cause the public to be  
less welcoming. Therefore, my third hypothesis is the following: 
H3: Migration policy changes that are more restrictive are likely to cause public 
attitudes towards migration to become less favorable. 
 
3.1 The Role of Salience 
Furthermore, scholars also emphasize that the issue salience of the policy area in question is 
very important when trying to explain the relationship between public opinion and policies. 
Issue salience is a moderator for the relationship between public opinion and policy changes. 
It is regarded to strengthen the relationship. For instance, Wlezien and Soroka notice that 
“the public salience of the policy domain matters – the public pays more attention to policy-
making in domains it considers to be important” (2012, pp. 1409–1410). When the public 
sees a certain issue as very salient, and therefore pays more attention to what the government 
does in this policy field, the government is likely to be restricted in its policy changes. Paul 
Burstein (2003) shows that salience has a substantial effect on public responsiveness (2003, 
p. 30). Previous research also showed that this impact on public responsiveness is only high 
when the issue salience is high as well (Jones, 1994). Otherwise, the impact might not only 
be small but nonexistent (Wlezien and Soroka, 2012, p. 1410). For example, foreign policy 
issues tend to have a lower public responsiveness which is attributed to the public usually 
being inadequately informed on this policy area (Burstein, 2003, p. 31; Page and Shapiro, 
1983; Jones, 1994). Therefore, I present my next hypothesis relating to the role of issue 
salience in the relationship between public policy changes and public opinion: 
H4: A high salience of migration will lead the migration policy changes to have a 
stronger impact on public opinion towards migration than low issue salience. 
Nonetheless, there are several factors that can constrain the relationship between opinion  
and policy. Wlezien and Soroka (2012, p. 1408) for instance, examine the role of political 
institutions which can either constrain or enhance the connection, regardless of salience 
levels. They argue that the vertical division of powers in federalist governments could dilute 
the signaling of the government, meaning the public could be less informed about the 
intentions and impact of government policies (Wlezien and Soroka, 2012, p. 1411). This  
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can furthermore negatively influence the responsiveness of the government to the public, 
especially in between elections (Wlezien and Soroka, 2012, p. 1412).  
Other scholars, such as Abou-Chadi et al. (2019) looked into how political parties adjust 
their policies in response to changes in issue saliency. Unlike smaller parties, larger parties 
adjust their policies according to the voters` preferences (Abou-Chadi et al., 2019, p. 2). 
Interestingly, the authors found out that political parties adjust their positions regarding 
environmental and welfare issues, in regard to migration issues, the findings do “not reach  
a conventional level of statistical significance” (Abou-Chadi et al., 2019, p. 12). As these 
theoretical and empirical deliberation show, it is not completely certain that the migration 
policy changes in Austria and Sweden have had an impact on public attitudes and opinion 
towards migration. Therefore, my last hypothesis is: 
H0: The impact of migration policy changes on public opinion towards refugees is 
very limited and not affected by saliency. 
 
3.2 Migration Policies  
I will now focus on the literature on migration policies as they are the policies of interest  
for this thesis. Contact theory is a prominent theory that expects an overall decrease in 
prejudices and anti-immigrant sentiments the more contact people have with immigrants 
(Allport, 1954). Nonetheless, newer research in the field of migration policies showed that 
there is a considerable gap between ‘liberal’ migration policies and the public’s preferences 
for tough restrictions (Ford et al., 2015, p. 1392). Previous literature identified two distinct 
ways of how people perceive immigration as a threat: as a clash of economic interests 
(Sniderman et al., 2004, p. 35) and as threat to national identity (Luedtke, 2005). Concerns 
about culture or national identity has proven to be more relevant to explain migration policy 
preferences in Western European countries than the economic explanations (Ivarsflaten, 
2005). This correlates with hypotheses 2 and 3 that postulate a relationship between the 
governments’ response towards refugees and the perceived level of threat.  
Traditionally, European countries had more experience with emigration than immigration 
(Freeman, 2006, p. 228). This does set them apart from countries such as the United States  
of America or Canada which were significantly built and shaped by immigrants. Ford et al. 
(2015) also found evidence for the importance of salience. They show that when a certain 
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area of immigration policy becomes politically salient, “policy-makers have responded  
by seeking to restrict it” (Ford et al., 2015, p. 1393). Furthermore, the public’s attitudes 
towards migration are reacting to changes in the migration levels and the attitudes also  
differ depending on the migrant groups (Ford et al., 2015, p. 1391). This also aligns with  
the hypotheses 2 and 3. 
Even though previous research has focused more on the impact of public opinion on policies 
than on the effect policy changes have on public attitudes, I think that the latter should not  
be neglected. Stating that policy affects policy more than the other way around (Page and 
Shapiro, 1983) does not mean that it is of lesser importance and is not worthy of research. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether the whether the migration policy 
changes implemented by the Austrian and Swedish governments, after the onset of the  
so-called migration crisis, impacted the public opinions of Austrians and Swedes towards 
migration and if this impact has been increased due to a higher saliency of migration. This 
means that I assume public opinion towards immigration from non-EU countries to be more 
responsive to national migration policy changes after the onset of the so-called migration 
crisis as the influx in refugees and asylum-seekers that entered the EU in that time increased 
the salience of migration.  
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4.1 Methodology  
4.1 Case Study Approach 
A case study is a form of non-experimental research that is characterized by the small 
number of cases with a large number of diverse empirical observations for each case (Blatter 
and Haverland, 2012, p. 19). As a qualitative research method, it aims to paint an in-depth 
picture of the phenomenon (Yin, 2014, p. 16). Therefore, the data collection for the case 
study research is extensive and draws from various sources (Yin, 2014, p. 16). Through  
this, case studies derive their strong internal validity (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013, p. 1303). 
According to John Gerring, case study research consists of the following elements:  
the population which incorporates all relevant cases (Gerring, 2007, p. 22); a sample  
“of whatever cases are subjected to formal analysis” (Gerring, 2007, p. 21); the case that is 
“a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some 
period of time” (Gerring, 2007, p. 19); and observations, which are “the most basic element 
of any empirical endeavor (Gerring, 2007, p. 20). I will discuss the case selection process in 
its own sub-chapter. Given this short introduction to what case study research is, it becomes 
apparent that it is a very broad term, and Gerring even goes as far as saying, that any 
research that is not a case study is quantitative (Gerring, 2007, p. 33). Since it is so broad, 
there are various forms of case study research, with the comparative method being the one  
I will apply for this thesis. It is a form of case study in which one compares two or more 
units of analysis at the same point in time (Gerring, 2007, p. 27). Even though, case study 
research is often paired with causal process tracing, I will use the method of Qualitative 
Content Analysis (QCA) as a means of data collection for my independent variable of 
migration policy changes.  
 
4.2 Qualitative Content Analysis 
Qualitative Content Analysis is a method that was originally developed in order to analyse 
and interpret newspaper articles and therefore has its roots in communication studies 
(Schreier, 2012, p. 9). It is a research method that is used to systematically describe 
qualitative material and its meaning (Schreier, 2012, p. 1). This is achieved through 
“classifying material as instances of the categories of a coding frame” (Schreier, 2012, p. 1). 
It is applicable to various kinds of data which can be visual, written, or for example stems 
from interviews even though it is most often used for verbal data (Schreier, 2012, pp. 2–3). 
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However, QCA is especially useful when the data has latent meaning and therefore has to be 
interpreted (Schreier, 2012, p. 2). What distinguishes QCA from other qualitative methods is 
its focus on certain selected aspects of the data that are being dictated by the research aim 
(Schreier, 2012, p. 4). Therefore, qualitative content analysis does not provide a complete 
overview of the data, but rather focuses on relevant aspects.  
With the systematic approach of QCA, Margrit Schreier lists the following sequence of steps 
that are to be followed (Schreier, 2012, pp. 5–6): 
1. Deciding on the research question 
2. Selection of material 
3. Building the coding frame which normally consists of several main categories  
with their own subcategories 
4. Arrange the material into units of coding 
5. Testing the coding frame 
6. Evaluate and adjust the coding frame especially in terms of validity 
7. Conduct the main analysis 
8. Interpret and present the findings 
The coding frames, which are intended for structuring the data and material, consist of 
several levels of categories and subcategories depending on the scope and aim of the 
research question (Schreier, 2012, pp. 61–63). Nonetheless, the coding frame and the 
categories have to meet certain requirements. These are: “unidimensionality, mutual 
exclusiveness, exhaustiveness, and saturation” (Schreier, 2012, p. 71).  
Unidimensionality means that each dimension of a coding frame only encompasses  
one aspect of the material (Schreier, 2012, p. 72). Mutual exclusiveness concerns the 
subcategories of a dimension, in which “a unit of coding can be assigned to one of these 
subcategories only” (Schreier, 2012, p. 75). Exhaustiveness refers to the ability “to assign 
each unit of coding in your material to at least one subcategory in your coding frame” 
(Schreier, 2012, p. 76). The last requirement, saturation, means that each subcategory of  
the coding frame has to be used at least once (Schreier, 2012, p. 77). As the coding frames 
and the categories in QCA are to a certain degree data-driven and inductive (Schreier, 2012, 
p. 7), I will show the specific coding frames and the utilized categories and subcategories 
later on in this thesis.  
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Qualitative content analysis emerged from quantitative content analysis (Schreier, 2012, p. 
18) and even though both forms of content analysis cannot be sharply divided, there are 
some important differences (Schreier, 2012, pp. 15–16). These differences for instance 
concern the role of reliability and validity. In quantitative content analysis, validity is less 
important than reliability, whereas in QCA both are of equal importance (Schreier, 2012, p. 
16). Another distinction between both forms is that in QCA, the coding is partly data-driven, 
while in quantitative content analysis is more concept-driven (Schreier, 2012, p. 16). This 
focus on latent meaning makes reliability harder to achieve in QCA than in quantitative 
content analysis. And the inductive approach to the coding frame makes validity checks 
more important as one has to make sure that the coding frame captures the latent meaning of 
the material (Schreier, 2012, p. 16). This focus on the latent meaning also means that QCA 
needs more context for the analysis than its quantitative counterpart.  
Therefore, I will use QCA to systematically describe and categorise the migration policy 
changes in Austria and Sweden before and after the onset of the so-called migration crisis. 
The categorization of the policy changes will be useful to determine the direction the policy 
changes take. The relationship of these policy changes and the publics opinion on migration 
however cannot be directly captured through QCA. Thus, I will use QCA primarily as a 
method of data collection for my analysis.  
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5. Empirical Analysis 
As mentioned before, the aim of this thesis is to see if the more restrictive migration policy 
changes in Austria and Sweden affected public opinion to become more critical towards 
immigration and if less restrictive policy changes would affect public opinion to become 
more welcoming as well. Therefore, I will be looking into migration policy changes in  
these two countries in the time period from late 2010 to 2016. I chose this timeframe as it 
encapsulates the time before the large influx of migrants coming to the European Union and 
the time period after the onset of the crisis in the second half of 2015. In 2015 and 2016, 
immigration was also deemed most salient (European Commission, 2018c, pp. 13–15)  
by European citizens. Furthermore, I expect the governments of Austria and Sweden to  
have implemented more changes shortly after the onset of the crisis than in the years that 
followed. I derive this expectation from the fact that the number of first-time asylum-seekers 
and applicants has decreased significantly after 2016 in the EU overall, as well as Austria 
and Sweden (Eurostat, 2018).  
In 2018, the number of applications reached its pre-crisis levels again (Eurostat, 2019).  
This implies that the European Union, as well as the two countries of my analysis have 
implemented policies that are better equipped to restrict the arrival of asylum-seekers in the 
EU. Especially since the conflicts in the countries the most asylum-seekers derive from – 
Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Eurostat, 2019) – have not yet died down. 
The second half of 2010 was chosen as the starting point for the analysis due to several 
reasons. The first reason is that the Eurobarometer studies started to include the question  
on what the public deems important (European Commission, 2015c, p. 48). This is a very 
practical reason. Another reason for starting in 2010 is that it enables me to better analyze 
and compare the development of migration policies in Austria and Sweden overall. 
Furthermore, Austria implemented major changes to its migration policies in 2010 and 2011 
as well (DEMIG, 2015), making it important to include these years in the analysis as well. 
 
5.1 Case Selection 
The selection of Austria and Sweden as the units of analysis is based on the countries’ public 
opinions towards immigration. I based the selection on a Special Eurobarometer Survey that 
was conducted in the fall of 2017 (European Commission, 2018b). Even though this survey 
was conducted after time period for my analysis, it is a very useful report that deals with  
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the integration of immigrants in the European Union and measured citizens’ personal 
experiences and attitudes towards migrants from non-EU countries as well. Compared to  
the other EU member states, Sweden was the country in which the citizens expressed the 
most favorable views towards immigration from outside the EU with 45% of Swedes stating 
that they see immigration as more of an opportunity (European Commission, 2018b, p. 58). 
19% of those polled in Sweden stated that they see immigration to be more of a problem. 
This number was only lower in Luxembourg at 17% (European Commission, 2018b, p. 58). 
In Austria on the other hand, only 13% see non-EU immigration as more of an opportunity, 
which is significantly below the EU average of 20% (European Commission, 2018b, p. 58). 
On top of that, 37% of Austrians regarded immigration to be more of a problem and 40% see 
immigration as equally a problem and opportunity (European Commission, 2018b, p. 58). 
Albeit, there are other European countries that have even less favorable opinions towards 
immigration than Austria. However, they are mostly Eastern European countries and Italy 
and France (European Commission, 2018b, p. 58) which makes them a lesser fit for a 
comparative study in my opinion. 
Austria and Sweden have several similarities. They are two Western European countries 
with similar population sizes and economic performances that joined the European Union  
at the same time (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). On top of that are both member 
countries of the Schengen area and do not have an outer Schengen border, unlike Hungary  
or Greece. Another big advantage of studying Austria and Sweden is the availability of the 
data as there is no language barrier for me with these two countries. 
 
5.2 Data and Sample 
The data I chose and collected for my analysis stems from various sources. This has several 
reasons. First, as I need data for the policy changes, the increased salience, as well as the 
public’s opinion towards immigration, I need to rely on several sources. And second, by 
applying triangulation, I am able to get data from different angles which helps to minimize 
inaccuracy (King et al., 1995, pp. 479–480). Conforming to the Qualitative Content Analysis 
methodology , I derived the following categories for the migration policy changes in Austria 
and Sweden:  
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Figure 1: The coding frame for the analysis. 
The coding divides the migration policy changes depending on when the migration policy 
change was introduced. This means, I differentiate between before and after the onset of  
the crisis. Furthermore, I then subdivide the policy changes according to their character or 
intention. These subcategories are named more restrictive and less restrictive and are part of 
each main category. Less restrictive policy changes refer to policies that have the intention 
of improving the situation for the policy recipients. This could for instance mean, that the 
government is providing more funding, granting refugees access to the labor market, or 
granting refugees permanent residency. More restrictive migration policy changes, on the 
other hand, refer to policies that have the intention of deterring refugees and migrants from 
entering the country or limiting their access to the labor market. This coding frame therefore 
enables me to clearly identify and classify all migration policy changes in Austria and 
Sweden.  
In line with my chosen timeframe, I will use the Standard Eurobarometer surveys number 
74-86 for data on the issue saliency of immigration in Austria and Sweden. These reports  
are being conducted and published twice a year by the European Commission in the  
EU’s member states (European Commission, 2019). Due to their large scale and regular 
publishing, the Eurobarometer surveys are suitable to measure the public’s opinion as well as 
identify salient issues over a given time period. The survey routinely asks what the citizens 
see as the two most important issues facing their country and the European Union as a 
whole. Starting in the fall of 2010, when the question was asked for the first time (European 
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Commission, 2015c, p. 48), one can see that the average rate at which immigration was 
named sharply increased after the onset of the crisis, even though it was on an upwards trend 
beforehand as well (European Commission, 2018c, pp. 13, 17). 
 
Figure 2: The two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment. 
In order to measure the migration policies of Sweden and Austria, as well as the policy 
changes before the onset of the migration crisis, I will, amongst others, also use the  
DEMIG POLICY datasets on migration policy changes in Sweden and Austria until 2014 
(DEMIG, 2015). These datasets list migration policy changes for 45 countries worldwide 
dating back several decades. In the cases of Sweden and Austria, the dataset provides 
information on migration policies from 1918 onwards. However, as the DEMIG POLICY 
datasets do not cover policies in Austria and Sweden that were introduced after 2014, I rely 
on different sources for the more recent migration policy changes that were implemented in 
2015 and 2016. For Sweden, the data material used for the migration policy changes also 
stem from the English website of the Swedish migration agency Migrationsverket which lists 
an historical overview of migration in Sweden (Migrationsverket, 2019). Another source for 
Swedish migration policy changes, starting in 2015, is the Swedish ministry of justice which 
publishes fact sheets on Sweden’s migration and asylum policy in English (Ministry of 
Justice, 2018, 2019) on a regular basis. These governmental agencies provided most of the 
material used for the Swedish policies. I used additional input from articles written by Bernd 
Parusel on Sweden’s reaction to the so-called migration crisis.  
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Figure 3: Immigration named as one of the two most important issues facing the EU  
at the moment. 
For migration policy changes in Austria, I also relied on DEMIG POLICY datasets, as  
well as a multitude of other sources. For instance, Heinz Fassmann’s articles written for the 
German Federal Agency for Civic Education (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) in 2015 
have proven to be informative (Fassmann, 2015a, 2015b). For the policy developments in 
2015 and 2016, I heavily relied on Austrian, as well as international newspapers written in 
German and English. Another important source for policy changes were the country reports 
written by Anny Knapp and the Asylkoordination Österreich (asylum coordination Austria) 
which were published by the Asylum Information Database (AIDA).  
If possible, I tried to use sources and material provided by the national governments. 
However, this was not always possible, especially in the case of Austria. Therefore,  
I resolved to using secondary sources from various origins. I tried to objectively classify  
the migration policy changes mentioned in my material according to my coding scheme. 
Lastly, it is important to mention that the reason for not extending the timeframe of the 
analysis to also cover 2017 or even 2018 is that there were no further migration policy 
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5.3 Main Results 
 
Figure 4: Migration Policy Changes in Austria and Sweden 2010-2016 
Figure 10 gives an overview over the number of migration policy changes that were 
implemented in Sweden and Austria between 2010 and 2016. It shows that there were quite  
a few policy changes before the onset of the so-called migration crisis. Especially in Austria, 
the government under former Austrian chancellor Werner Faymann (social democrats) 
implemented various reforms in 2010 and 2011 that focused on high-skilled labor integration 
(Fassmann, 2015b). One example of these changes is the introduction of the Red-White-Red 
card for highly skilled workers in July of 2011 (Fassmann, 2015b). At the same time were 
the amendments focused on restricting access for migrants with little to no German skills 
(DEMIG, 2015). In 2012, Austria made it easier for minor asylum seekers to be granted 
work permits for vocational training (DEMIG, 2015). This liberalization to the labor market 
continued in Austria until 2014, where Austria opened its labor market to Romanians and 
Bulgarians (DEMIG, 2015).  
Similarly, in Sweden, most migration policy changes before the onset of the so-called 
migration crisis were about migrants’ and asylum seekers’ access to the Swedish labor 
market in 2010 (DEMIG, 2015). However, some of the changes were more restrictive. For 
instance, in 2010, it became harder for labor migrants from non-EEA countries to get their 
families to migrate to Sweden as well (DEMIG, 2015). In 2011, Sweden introduced tuition 
fees for students of non-EU countries, which was also a more restrictive policy change. 
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Furthermore, the Swedish government imposed stricter requirements for employers hiring 
workers from outside the European Union in 2012 (DEMIG, 2015).  
When comparing Austria’s and Sweden’s migration policy changes leading up to the so-
called migration crisis, one can say that Austria’s main focus was on attracting highly skilled 
workers from non-EU countries. Sweden’s focus was similar, however, a larger portion of 
their migration policy changes before the onset of the crisis was addressing asylum seekers 
than the migration changes in Austria.  
Austria and Sweden both experienced national elections within the time period of analysis. 
Sweden elected a new parliament in 2010 (Valmyndigheten, 2010). There was no govern-
ment change with the center-right alliance governing, however, the Sweden Democrats 
entered the parliament for the first time. Austria reelected its social-democratic chancellor  
in 2013 who remained in office until 2016. Another similarity between Austria and Sweden 
is that the populist right-wing parties in both countries experienced electoral successes.  
The growing success of those parties, that often proclaim anti-refugee and anti-immigrant 




As mentioned before, Austria’s asylum and migration policies mainly focused on the 
accommodation, the reception, the asylum process, voluntary returns and deportations 
(Fassmann, 2015a) before the onset of the crisis. This can also be seen in the policy  
changes from 2013 and 2014 (DEMIG, 2015). Austria passed legislation on labor market 
integration in 2013 that was less restrictive (DEMIG, 2015). Furthermore, Austria opened  
its labor market for Romanians and Bulgarians in 2014 (DEMIG, 2015). In January 2014, 
Austria created a Federal Office for Asylum and Migration meant to bundle its competences 
(DEMIG, 2015). Then, in August 2015, Austria installed a new refugee coordinator tasked 
with finding accommodations and lodgings for the ever increasing number of asylum seekers 
coming to Austria (Sablatnig, 2015). As I will discuss later, most of the migration policy 
changes starting with the appointment of the refugee coordinator in August of 2015 are more 
restrictive on both, the external and internal dimension. Because of this, I expect the public 
opinion in Austria to become less welcoming as well (hypothesis 3). However, as I Austria’s 
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migration policy changes were mainly more restrictive in 2010, and less restrictive in 2011, I 
expect the public’s attitude to become more favorable over the period from 2010 to 2015.  
The following figure shows how many Austrians regarded immigration as one of the two 
most important issues the EU and Austria are facing at the moment. The data stems from  
the Standard Eurobarometer Surveys 74-86 where these two questions are regularly asked. 
The responses given are a good indicator for the perceived saliency of an issue. Therefore, 
the graph clearly shows a sharp increase in the saliency of immigration at the same time as 
the onset of the so-called migration crisis in the EU in general and in Austria. Furthermore, 
the levels are higher in the years 2010 and 2011 which correlates with the relatively large 
amounts of policy changes that were implemented in these years. Afterwards, the issue was 
mentioned less in these surveys. However, in 2013, parallel to the national elections, more 
Austrians perceived immigration on a European level to be an important issue than before. 
Nonetheless, the saliency levels remained low compared to the later years.  
 
Figure 5: Immigration as one of the two most important issues according to Austria 
In September of 2015, the Austrian government started to introduce controls on its southern 
borders (Eddy and Bilefsky, 2015). Later, in October 2015, Austria publicly announced  
its plans to build a border fence on its border with Slovenia (The Telegraph, 2015).  
The building of said fence then began on December 7th, 2015 (Der Standard, 2015a). Like 
Sweden, Austria also restricted its asylum rights. People under subsidiary protection have  
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to wait for three years for family reunifications instead of the previous 12 months  
(Der Standard, 2015b). Furthermore, refugees have to meet certain financial requirements  
to qualify for family reunifications (Der Standard, 2015b). In January 2016, Austria was 
announcing even stricter border controls than before (DW, 2016). They intended to mainly 
let those asylum seekers in who wanted to merely pass through Austria. On January 20th, 
2016, Austria announced that it wanted to limit the number of asylum applications to 37,500 
per year (Der Standard, 2015c). This decision was met with a lot of criticism (BBC News, 
2016b) as it is seemingly in violation of the Geneva convention (Der Standard, 2015c).  
A couple weeks later, on February 19th, Austria reduces the number of applications to 80 a 
day (Der Standard, 2016). There were also several changes regarding the financial aid people 
under subsidiary protection are entitled to, which were reduced in several Austrian states 
(Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, pp. 13–14). A major policy change was  
also that asylum is now only being granted for three years (Knapp and Asylkoordination 
Österreich, 2017, p. 13). Before that, asylum seekers had indefinite right of residence  
(Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 13).  
 
Figure 6: Immigration evokes a positive feeling in % 
However, there were also some policy changes that are less restrictive. For example was  
the time limit for the submission of appeals extended in February 2016 (Knapp and Asyl-
koordination Österreich, 2017, p. 12). And on June 1st, 2016 “the maximum duration of 
proceedings at the BFA was extended” (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017,  
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p. 12). There was also a slight increase in funding and reimbursements of expenses in 
relation to asylum seekers; this also included the allowance asylum-seekers receive (Knapp 
and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 13). Lastly, on October 1st, 2016, asylum-seekers’ 
rights for legal representation in appeals were strengthened (Knapp and Asylkoordination 
Österreich, 2017, p. 12).  
When it comes to the public opinion in Austria towards immigration and immigrants,  
I also rely on data provided by the Standard Eurobarometer surveys. Unfortunately, there  
is no previous data provided by the Eurobaromter surveys for the whole period of analysis. 
Starting with the Standard Eurobarometer Survey 82, which was conducted in the fall of 
2014, respondents were asked a series of questions relating to their attitudes towards 
immigration. These questions were whether they are in favor of a common European policy 
on migration, if EU and non-EU immigration evokes a positive feeling, and whether the EU 
should apply additional measures to fight illegal/irregular immigration. Unfortunately, these 
questions were not asked in earlier Eurobarometer surveys, which could be attributed to the 
lower issue salience of immigration at that time.  
 
Figure 7: “Should additional measures be taken to fight irregular immigration  
of people from outside the EU?” in % 
Regarding the support of a common European policy on migration, Austrians were less 
supportive than the Swedes and the European average. In the fall of 2014, 59% of Austrians 
were in favor, this was the lowest value with Czech Republic, Finland and the UK (European 
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Commission, 2014c, p. 175). Austria’s support level remained the same until the fall of 
2016, when it dropped to 55% (European Commission, 2016a, p. 43). Regarding to Austria’s 
attitudes towards immigrants from the EU and other countries, Austrians opinions are very 
similar to the European-wide average, as the following figure 6 shows. Interestingly, the 
support for migrants from other EU member states and from non-EU countries goes up or 
stays relatively stable between the fall of 2014 and the fall of 2016.  
The question regarding whether there should be additional measures taken against irregular 
migration was asking about fighting illegal immigration at first. From the Eurobarometer 
survey 85 in spring 2016 onward, the question was rephrased to irregular immigration 
(European Commission, 2016b, p. 54). Here, one can see that most Austrians favor joint 
efforts on the national and European level (see figure 7). Between spring and fall of 2016, 
however, this option loses support while efforts mainly on the national or European level 
gain support.  
 
5.3.2 Sweden: 
Sweden is and was one of the main destination countries for asylum-seekers in Europe. 
Compared to its population size, Sweden took in more than other EU countries (Parusel, 
2016a, p. 2). In 2015 alone, there were more than 160,000 new asylum-seekers in Sweden, 
which was twice as much than in 2014, where around 80,000 came (Parusel, 2016a, p. 2). 
However, Sweden was able to reduce that number to less than 29,000 in 2016 (Migrations-
verket, 2017, p. 24). This drastic drop in numbers is also a sign that Sweden has 
implemented various migration policy changes after the onset of the so-called migration 
crisis in the second half of 2015.  
Before the onset of the crisis, Sweden was known for its ‘generous’ asylum policies  
(Parusel, 2017) which is in line with the aforementioned large number of asylum-seekers. 
This generosity can also be seen in the last asylum and migration policy change before the 
crisis in September of 2013. This policy change granted all Syrians and stateless people who 
came to Sweden from Syria permanent residence permits (Migrationsverket, 2019). The 
policy changes which were implemented after the onset of the crisis all fall into the more 
restrictive category of my coding frame (which can be found in the appendix). Therefore,  
 I expect the Swedish public opinion towards immigration to become more critical as well 
(hypothesis 3).  
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The following figure shows how many Swedes regarded immigration as one of the two most 
important issues the EU and Sweden are facing at the moment. The data also stems from  
the Standard Eurobarometer Surveys 74-86 where these two questions are regularly asked. 
The figure clearly shows a sharp increase in the saliency of immigration at the same time as 
the onset of the so-called migration crisis. Compared to Austria and the European average, 
immigration is a much more salient issue in Sweden. Before the onset of the crisis, Swedes 
however regarded European immigration as less of an issue as immigration to Sweden.  
This goes along with the kind of migration policies that were implemented in that time 
period and hypotheses 2 and 3. Furthermore, immigration was also one of the main issues  
in the Swedish national elections in 2014 and 2018 (Skodo, 2018), also indicating a high 
saliency of the issue. In these elections, the populist Sweden Democrats were very successful 
and laid focus on immigration in their campaigning, this is likely to have contributed to the 
rise in saliency of the issue of immigration. Nonetheless, Sweden elected a new prime 
minister, Stefan Löfven from the social democrats.  
 
Figure 8: Immigration as one of the two most important issues according to Sweden 
The first policy change the Swedish government implemented after the beginning of the 
crisis was to introduce temporary border controls with the intention to reduce the amount  
of asylum-seekers (Parusel, 2017). This was on November 12th, 2015. Shortly after, on 
January 4th, 2016, Sweden installed temporary ID checks on its borders (Regeringen och 
Regeringskansliet, 2017). This meant that “bus, train and ferry companies are no longer 
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allowed to carry passengers without identity documents from neighbouring Denmark or 
Germany to Sweden” (Parusel, 2016c). Through these policy changes, the “weekly arrivals 
were only about 5% of those recorded in early November 2015” (Parusel, 2016c). Another 
reason for why the numbers were so low probably was the closing of the ‘Balkan route’ and 
the EU-Turkey deal (Parusel, 2017).  
Two months later, on March 1st, it was stated that “all municipalities are compelled to 
receive a portion of the refugees” (Migrationsverket, 2019) which aimed at a better 
distribution across Sweden. On June 1st, 2016, a policy came into force that was meant  
to increase the number of voluntary returns of people whose asylum application got a 
negative response (Parusel, 2017). The policy cut the right to aid for these asylum-seekers 
(Migrationsverket, 2019). Furthermore, persons that were to be deported lose “the right to a 
daily allowance, and to asylum accommodation paid for by the Swedish Migration Agency” 
(Migrationsverket, 2019). However, according to a report from the Swedish migration 
agency, the incentives for a voluntary return do not seem to have the desirable effect, as  
only a small fraction of these asylum seekers leave Sweden voluntarily (Migrationsverket, 
2017, p. 53).  
In July 2016, Sweden reduced the protection granted to the minimum mandated through EU 
and international law for three years (Parusel, 2017). This means that, unlike before, Sweden 
only grants protection for a maximum of three years at a time (Migrationsverket, 2019).  
On top of that, the possibility of family reunions has also been limited (Ministry of Justice, 
2019, p. 1; Parusel, 2017). People that are granted subsidiary protection and therefore did not 
receive refugee status are no longer granted family reunifications (Migrationsverket, 2019). 
Also, people under subsidiary protection are only given permits for 13 months that can  
be extended (Migrationsverket, 2019). As people with refugee status are in a minority,  
the restriction on family reunions has a huge effect on migration numbers (Parusel, 2017).  
Furthermore, the amount of women and children seeking asylum in Sweden rose, as they  
are affected most by the restriction on family reunions (Parusel, 2017). Even though  
the immigration and asylum policies became more restrictive on both, the internal and 
external dimension, made the Swedish government “more funding available for integration 
measures” (Parusel, 2016b, p. 12), especially in the field of labor market integration (Skodo, 
2018). Nonetheless, the changes can be seen as a “move toward tying immigration rights to 
integration achievements” (Skodo, 2018).  
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Figure 9: Immigration evokes a positive feeling in % 
When it comes to the public opinion in Sweden towards immigration and immigrants,  
I also rely on data provided by the Standard Eurobarometer surveys as I did for Austria. 
Regarding the support of a common European policy on migration, there was consistently  
a high percentage of Swedes who were in favor. Compared to other countries, Sweden had 
one of the highest approval rates for such a policy.  
The lowest support rate given for such a policy was in the fall of 2014 with 69%  
(European Commission, 2014c, p. 175) and the highest was in the fall of 2015 with 78% 
(European Commission, 2015b, p. 47). In the other surveys, 76% approved in the fall of 
2016 (European Commission, 2016a, p. 43), 75% in the spring of 2016; and 77% approved 
in the spring of 2015 (European Commission, 2015c, p. 151). This stance is also supported 
by the Swedish government (Ministry of Justice, 2018) which is promoting burden-sharing 
and further cooperation amongst countries.  
Concerning attitudes towards immigrants from the EU and other countries, Sweden scored 
amongst the highest values when it comes to support for immigrants. For immigrants that 
stem from other European countries, the values are higher, however, Sweden’s attitude 
towards non-EU immigrants was a lot higher compared to the European average. The 
following figure illustrates Sweden’s attitude towards immigrants over time compared to  
the EU average.  
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Figure 10: “Should additional measures be taken to fight irregular immigration  
of people from outside the EU?” in % 
When the Eurobarometer surveys asked about whether there should be additional measures 
taken to fight illegal/irregular migration, Sweden’s preferences stay relatively consistent  
(see figure 10). However, there is a large increase in Swedes favoring efforts taken mainly at 
the EU level from spring to fall 2016 and a significant drop in respondents favoring efforts 
on both levels. Compared to Austria’s responses, a lot more Swedes do not see a need for 
further efforts and Swedes prefer the EU level over the national level, unlike Austrians  
(see figure 7).  
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6. Discussion of Results:  
As the analysis showed, the migration policy changes of both countries changed after  
the onset of the crisis, not only in quantity, but also in the sense that they became more 
restrictive. The issue salience of immigration also increased significantly in the second half 
of 2015. The Eurobarometer surveys showed that 58 per cent of Europeans considered 
immigration as one of the two most important issues facing the EU (European Commission, 
2018c, p. 13) in the fall of 2015. However, only 36% of Europeans saw immigration as  
one of the two most pressing issues for their own countries (European Commission, 2018c, 
p. 17). In the two countries of the analysis, Austria and Sweden, these values were a lot 
higher. 56% of Austrians saw immigration as an issue for Austria, whereas 66% thought 
immigration was of high importance for the EU (European Commission, 2016c, pp. 49; 56). 
For Sweden, these numbers are even higher. 53% of Swedes considered immigration to  
be one of the main issues for Sweden whereas 74% of Swedes considered immigration  
to be important for the European Union. In the fall of 2010, 14% of Swedes considered 
immigration to be an important issue for Sweden, this number dropped to 9% in the fall  
of 2011, but then rose tp 14% in the spring of 2014, therefore remaining relatively stable 
over these years.  
Starting in 2014, the numbers then started to increase from 14% in spring to 28% in early 
2015 (see figure 8). Austria’s responses started off higher at 21% for the national level in  
fall 2010 and spring of 2011 (see figure 5) and then dropped to 12% in the spring of 2012. 
Afterwards, they remaind relatively consistent until they began to rise in 2014 being 20%  
in the fall of 2014 (see figure 5). The highest value was achieved in the fall of 2015 with 
56% of Austrians naming immigration an important issue (see figure 5). I would attribute 
Austria’s relatively high values for 2010 and 2011 to the many migration policy changes  
that were implemented at that time (see figure 4) that were restricting for asylum seekers 
(DEMIG, 2015) while trying to attract highly skilled workers. The same, albeit to a lesser 
extent, I would also explain the small spike in Sweden with the comparatively high amount 
of migration policy changes that were implemented in 2010 (see figure 4). As the levels of 
migration policy changes and issue saliency correlate, I see a connection between these two 
and my first hypothesis somewhat validated.  
According to my theoretical assumptions, the public in both countries should therefore have 
become a lot more responsive in their attitudes towards their governments’ policy changes. 
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The Eurobarometer surveys, however, do not show that. Austria’s attitudes towards immi-
gration from other EU countries became more positive starting in spring of 2015 (figure 6). 
This somewhat supports hypothesis 2 stating that migration policy changes that are less 
restrictive are likely to cause public attitudes towards migration and migrants to become 
more favorable. The approval rates for non-EU immigrants, which includes refugees and 
asylum-seekers, is considerably lower in Austria (figure 6). It decreased from 35% in the fall 
of 2014 to 31% one year later (figure 6). Nonetheless, did the approval of immigrants from 
outside the EU increase to 36% in Austria in later 2016 and is therefore even higher than 
before the onset of the crisis (figure 6). EU-immigration in Sweden evoked a positive feeling 
in 80% of Swedes in the fall of 2015 (figure 9). Even though that number slightly decreased 
in early 2016, it went up to 83% in the fall of 2016 (figure 9). Swedish attitudes towards 
immigration from non-EU countries has been far more positive than on the European 
average or even in Austria. In the fall of 2014, 72% of Swedes claimed that it evoked a 
positive feeling and right after the onset of the so-called migration crisis in the second half  
of 2015, this number stood at 70%, compared to 34% in the European average (figure 9). 
However, the amount of people in Sweden stating a positive feeling towards non-EU 
immigration then dropped to 62% in spring of 2016 and 64% in the fall of 2016 (figure 9). 
This is in line with the third hypothesis that migration policy changes that are more 
restrictive are likely to cause public attitudes towards migration to become less favorable.  
These numbers show that in both countries, attitudes towards migrants from other EU 
countries became even more positive over the time period of analysis. This might be 
explained by the same theoretical assumptions that hypothesis 2 is based on. When asylum 
seekers and refugees are painted as ‘foreign’ and not a part of the culture, people might be 
more critical towards them. At the same time, migrants from other EU countries could 
however automatically be considered more as a part of society and therefore attitudes might 
be more welcoming. This differentiation between EU and non-EU migrants can often be 
seen in the rhetoric of parties such as the FPÖ and the Sweden Democrats. Considering non-
EU immigrants, who were the target of the migration policy changes, there is a decrease in 
positive attitudes visible in Sweden. Austria’s attitudes towards non-EU immigration has 
been a lot less positive throughout the period of analysis. Yet, Austrians have not become 
less positive towards non-EU immigration (figure 6). Therefore, my third hypothesis cannot 
be validated for the Austrian case. Still, one must keep in mind that not all the implemented 
policy changes were more restrictive in nature. Even though the more restrictive ones 
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garnered far more media attention which can be seen in the fact that international newspaper, 
such as the New York Times reported on them (Eddy and Bilefsky, 2015). In the case of 
Sweden, there is a decline in positive attitudes towards non-EU immigrants that correlate 
with the implementation of the more restrictive policy changes from the Swedish govern-
ment (hypothesis 3). Nonetheless, Swedes still voiced more positive attitudes than Austrians. 
Sweden seems to therefore fulfill my assumptions.  
Regarding hypothesis 4 that a high salience of migration will lead the migration policy 
changes to have a stronger impact on public opinion towards migration than low issue 
salience, no clear answer could be found. There are changes in public opinion noticeable, 
however the impact salience has on the relationship is not entirely measurable. Hypothesis 1, 
on the other hand, can be verified, as can hypotheses 2 and 3 even though to varying degrees. 
Hypothesis 0 also cannot directly be falsified. In the Austrian case, when the migration 
policy changes became more restrictive after the onset of the crisis, did the public opinion 
not change accordingly. However, that does not necessarily mean that policies do not affect 
opinion. What has been noticeable in my study however is that there seems to be a 
connection between policy changes and saliency levels.  
Having said that, there are several limitations to my study. As I only looked into two 
countries, it would be interesting to see how migration policy changes in the wake of the  
so-called refugee crisis would affect public attitudes towards immigration and migrants in 
other European countries. Furthermore, one would also need to account for media and press 
coverage of the crisis and investigate how the media framed the situation on the national and 
European level. It would also be interesting to find out if the effects of policy changes on 
attitudes vary depending on the initial public opinion towards migration. Other confounding 
factors could be the political system, or the political parties in government. For instance, 
Wlezien and Soroka (2012, p. 1411) state that the level of federalism can dilute the effect 
policy changes have on public opinion. Another criticism might be that the Eurobarometer 
surveys do not differentiate between the different types of immigration when asking 
European citizens about their attitudes towards immigration. However, I would argue  
that most people are not aware about the differences between refugees, asylum-seekers, 
regular immigration, and irregular immigration. Therefore, I think only measuring people’s 
attitudes towards immigration in general is sufficient. One of the main advantages of the 
Eurobarometer surveys definitely lies within its comparability across countries. If I had 
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chosen national surveys, I might have been able to gather more detailed information while 
simultaneously losing the possibility to compare the responses over time and across 
countries.  
In the years following the time period I analyzed, there were several Special Eurobarometer 
surveys conducted that focused on the Schengen Area (European Commission, 2018a) and 
on the integration of immigrants in the EU (European Commission, 2018b). In the survey  
on the Schengen Area which was conducted in the summer of 2018, a vast majority of 
Europeans (72%) are in favor of increased funding for strengthening the EU’s external 
borders (European Commission, 2018a, p. 20). And 79% of respondents would like to see 
the EU be more involved in helping countries secure the EU’s external borders (European 
Commission, 2018a, p. 18). The Special Eurobarometer survey on the integration of 
immigrants in the EU (European Commission, 2018b) found out that 38% of Europeans  
see non-EU immigration as more of a problem and 31% see it as equally a problem and an 
opportunity (European Commission, 2018b, p. 58). Unfortunately, as they were conducted 
after 2016 their responses are not as relevant for my study.  
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7. Conclusion  
In this thesis, I showed that there is a connection between immigration policy and public 
opinion. As the Swedish case showed, public attitudes towards immigration can somewhat 
change after policy changes are being implemented. However, it remains unclear if there 
were other confounding factors which had an effect on the strength of the relationship. In 
Austria, where the government had implemented even stricter and more restrictive policy 
changes than the Swedish government, the public opinion towards non-EU immigration did 
not change as I expected. Nonetheless, I made an important contribution to the research field 
of policy changes and public opinion. Even though the effects were smaller than expected,  
it showed a connection. Furthermore, and just as important, the usual explanation of public 
opinion affecting policy changes might also not fit in these cases. This shows that there is  
a need for further research into the specific effects the policy changes had on the public 
attitudes and why.  
Even though the Eurobarometer survey data does not show a massive change in public 
opinion towards immigration, right-wing populist parties have gained a lot of popularity 
since the onset of the so-called migration crisis in Sweden, Austria, and across Europe. 
Immigration from outside the European Union also remains a highly relevant topic in the EU 
and its member states. And several of the restrictive migration policy changes that had been 
implemented in the wake of the crisis are still in place. Therefore, it might also be possible 
that the effect and impact these changes had on the public’s attitudes towards immigration 
and immigrants is more long-term than I expected, and the consequences can only be seen 
with some temporal delay. But it also shows that the topic of this thesis was and remains 
highly relevant. Particularly when considering that the causes of the crisis, the conflicts 
across the world have not yet been resolved. Furthermore, there has not been a reform of  
the Dublin regulation and as Austria and Sweden also showed, exit costs for the Schengen 
regime are too small. The European Union therefore was not able to find a sustainable 
solution to the so-called migration crisis. In order to tackle future crises similar to the  
so-called migration crisis, there needs to be further integration on the European level. 
Interestingly, as both Austria and Sweden reduced their asylum rules to the EU-mandated 
minimum, the crisis might have led to further harmonization across Europe in the field of a 
Common European Asylum System.  
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Timeline Migration Policy Changes Austria  
January 2010 „Reform of the Asylum Act entered into force in January 2010 -  abolished 
the protection from deportation for claimants of subsequent asylum appli-
cations (asylum seekers who have been rejected and apply a second time). 
> If the asylum applicant files a new application after a negative asylum 
procedure, the asylum applicant does not automatically enjoy de facto 
protection against deportation.” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
January 2010 “Reform of the Asylum Act entered into force in January 2010 –  
redefined the offenses which may lead to detention of asylum seekers.  
> Detention pending deportation can be imposed on asylum applicants  
if the asylum applicant has received a negative decision due to the 
responsibility of another EU MS for the procedure (Dublin cases), as well 
as if the residence requirement, the reporting obligation or the obligation  
to cooperate are violated or there are specific cases of subsequent asylum 
applications. In all of these cases, detention pending deportation must be 
administered, if it is necessary to secure the expulsion procedure or the 
removal of the asylum applicant” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
January 2010 “Reform of the Asylum Act entered into force in January 2010 – 
introduced the possibility to deprive, under certain conditions, delinquent 
refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection of their status.” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
January 2010 “Reform of the Asylum Act entered into force in January 2010 - requiried 
asylum seekers whose request for asylum is judged by the authorities as 
unlikely to be successful to register” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2010 “As a measure to prevent forced and arranged marriages, the minimum age 
of partners requesting to enter Austria as family migrants was raised from 
18 to 21 years in 2010.” 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
January 19th, “On 19 January 2010, the National Action Plan on Integration (NAP.I)  
2010 was adopted - defining the principles on integration policies as well as 
goals in the areas of language, education, profession, rule of law, values, 
health, social issues, intercultural dialogue, sports, leisure, housing.“ 
Restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
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2010 “Creation of a Federal Office for Asylum and Migration planned in 
October 2010 under the Federal Ministry of the Interior - to bundle  
all competences at first instance. It should be created in 2014. 
> Currently, 113 offices, including district commissions, municipal 
authorities, federal police headquarters and the Federal Asylum Offices, 
are in charge of administering these processes, which often leads to 
inconsistent practices. “ 
Restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
July 2011 „Amendment to the Alien Law (Fremdenrechtsänderungsgesetz) enteres 
into force in July 2011 - created the Red-White-Red Card for specific 
labour migrants (highly qualified persons (Tier 1), skilled workers in 
shortage professions and key workers (Tier 2)). 
> The Card is granted on the basis of a points-based system, which 
replaces the previous quota system. The PBS takes into account age, 
professional background and german language skills. The RWR card is 
limited to one year and can then be transformed either in a RWR card  
plus or in an ordinary residence permit. “ 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2011 “Amendment to the Alien Law (Fremdenrechtsänderungsgesetz) - 
introduces the Red-White-Red Card Plus granting entry and working rights 
to family members of holders of the RWR Card or the EU Blue Card or of 
permanent residents in Austria. “ 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2011 “Amendment to the Alien Law (Fremdenrechtsänderungsgesetz) -  
created the "Visa for the Purpose of Job Search”, as well as the subsequent 
Red-White-Red Card for third-country nationals who completed a diploma 
or a master’s programme in Austria, as well as their family members. 
> The visa and the Card are granted on the basis of a points-based system. 
Once a job has been found, the graduates have the possibility to apply for 
the residence title ‘Red-White-Red Card’.” 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2011 “Amendment to the Alien Law (Fremdenrechtsänderungsgesetz) - raises 
the language requirements for naturalisation from level A2 to B1.” 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2011 “Amendment to the Alien Law (Fremdenrechtsänderungsgesetz) - requires 
people wishing to live in Austria to prove basic knowledge of the German 
language (A1) already before entering the country.” 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
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2011 “2004 EU enlargement - Austria finally opens its labour market for 
workers from the 2004 enlargement states” 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2011 “Amendment to the Alien Employment Law - loweres from May 1st 
onwards, the federal maximum number of migrant workers relative  
to the number of native workers from 8% to 7%.” 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
July 2011 “Amendment to the Asylum Act in July 2011 - forbids asylum seekers to 
leave the first reception centres for a period of up to 7 days maximum after 
filing the application for international protection, as part of the so called 
“duty to collaborate”. 
>The aim of this measure, according to policy makers, is to prevent 
individuals from absconding and to clarify whether Austria is responsible 
for the respective application for international protection” 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
October 2011 “Since October 2011, asylum seekers who have had their claim rejected by 
the asylum court are automatically provided with legal counceling and 
support by one of the NGOs designated to provide those services.  
> This was introduced because of EU-requirements.” 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2011 “In early 2011 a Secretary of State for Integration, in charge of the 
coordination of integration policies in various ministries, was created.  
> Together with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, it launched a 
website in early 2012 to provide information and guidance for the 
accreditation of foreign degrees. Information-points offering counselling 
services for the recognition and validation of foreign qualifications were 
established country-wide in early 2013. “ 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2012 “June 2012 decree - allowing minor asylum seekers until the age of  
18 years to be granted a work permit for vocational training (Lehre) in 
occupations where there is a shortage of apprentices.  
> This is, however, only possible three months after the application for 
asylum has been lodged and if the person has passed a labour market test.” 
Less restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2013 “2013 Amendment to the Alien Employment Law - cancells the federal 
maximum number of migrant workers to adapt the law to EU law. 
> This was done because the federal maximum stock number lost its 
relevance due to the opening of the labour market to EU8 in 2011.  
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Since then, the percentage of third country nationals in the federal stock of 
workers is much lower than 7% because new EU member states are not 
counted in anymore. The quota has hence lost its reason of being.” 
Less restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2013 “Alevits are being recognized as a religious community.” 
Less restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
January 2014 “Creation of a Federal Office for Asylum and Migration in order  
to bundle all competences at first instance.” 
Restrictive / Less restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2014 “2007 EU enlargement, open labor market for Romania and Bulgaria.” 
Less restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
August 2015 New refugee coordinator who is ordered to find new accommodation 
solutions; and the army is now allowed to help with the situation;  
mainly aimed at distribution and logistics. 
Restrictive  
Source: (Sablatnig, 2015)  
September 14th, Austria introduced border controls. 
2015   More Restrictive 
Source: (Eddy and Bilefsky, 2015), (Murphy, 2015) 
October, 2015 New constitutional law that is supposed to help with the  
accommodation of refugees. 
Less restrictive 
Source: (Sablatnig, 2015)  
October, 2015 Austria announces plans to build fence on the border to Slovenia. 
More Restrictive 
Source: (The Telegraph, 2015) 
November 15th, Restricting asylum rights; People under subsidiary protection  
2015 have to wait 3 years for family reunifications instead of 12 months; 
furthermore, refugees have to adhere to certain financial standards to 
qualify. This does not apply for unaccompanied minors (refugees);  
law is retroactive. 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Der Standard, 2015b) 
December 7th,  Beginning of building border fence to Slovenia. 
2015   More Restrictive 
Source: (Der Standard, 2015a) 
January 17th, Austria is announcing stricter border controls; Austria has now  
2016   temporarily suspended the Schengen rules. 
More Restrictive 
Source: (DW, 2016) 
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January 2016 Austria only wants to let those through that want to apply for asylum  
in Germany. 
More Restrictive 
Source: (DW, 2016) 
January 20th,  Limit on the number of asylum applications per year to 37500 per year.  
2016   More Restrictive 
Source: (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 12),  
(BBC News, 2016a), (Der Standard, 2015c) 
February 19th, Austria sets a limit on asylum applications per day to 80. 
2016   More Restrictive 
Source: (BBC News, 2016b), (Der Standard, 2016) 
February 23rd, “The time limit for the submission of an appeal had to be raised  
2016  following a judgment of the Constitutional Court (VfGH).  
The appeal period for challenging return decisions is 2 weeks, up from  
the previous 1-week deadline. For decisions of the BFA which are not 
accompanied by a return decision, the appeal period is now 4 instead of the 
previous 2 weeks. The appeal period was not raised with regard to cases 
where an asylum application is rejected and a return decision was ordered“ 
Less restrictive 
Source: (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 12) 
April 2016 “People granted subsidiary protection have been excluded from the needs-
based minimum benefit system in Lower Austria, contrary to Article 29  
of the recast Qualification Directive. Even before the reform, this group 
was only entitled to basic care benefits in some federal provinces“ 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, pp. 13–14) 
June 1st, 2016 “Several changes to the asylum procedure and content of international 
protection were introduced through the Aliens Law Amendment  
Act 2016 (FrÄG 2016) entering into force on 1 June 2016” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 12) 
June 1st, 2016 “The maximum duration of proceedings at the BFA was extended  
from 6 to 15 months, only subsequently request for devolution 
(Säumnisbeschwerde) is admissible” 
More Restrictive / Less restrictive 
Source: (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 12) 
July 1st, 2016 “The reimbursement of expenses concerning accommodation and 
subsistence were adjusted: the maximum cost rate for accommodation, 
subsistence and care in an organised reception centre is €21 per day. 
Asylum seekers living in private accommodation receive €365 instead  
of €320 per month. The rate for unaccompanied minors requiring the 
highest care was raised from €77 to €95. Places for unaccompanied  
minors with less intensive care receive €63.50 instead of €60 and  
€40.50 instead of €37.7  
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Although the amendments entered into force on 1 July 2016, not all states 
have adjusted the amount of the daily rate equally“ 
Less restrictive 
Source: (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 13) 
June 2016 Asylum is now only granted for 3 years; law is retroactive “Following the 
“temporary asylum” (Asyl auf Zeit) reform, the previously indefinite right 
of residence granted with asylum is now issued for the duration of 3 years 
since June 2016. The right to residence becomes indefinite ex officio, when 
no cessation proceedings have been commenced within these 3 years. The 
BFA issues yearly reports on the situation in important countries of origin. 
If these reports indicate that a substantial change has taken place in the 
countries, cessation proceedings have to be commenced“ 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 13),  
(Der Standard, 2015b) 
October 1st, “Legal representation in appeals: The duties of the legal advisors  
2016  provided by the state for the appeal procedure were clarified by a decision 
of the Administrative High Court. As of 1 October 2016, they are under  
the obligation to participate in hearings before the Federal Administrative 
Court and to represent applicants during the proceedings, if the asylum 
seeker so wishes. The Constitutional Court decided that differentiating  
the scope of legal advice according to the type of procedure – asylum, 
basic care or return proceedings – is discriminatory and, therefore, 
unconstitutional. “ 
Less restrictive 
Source: (Knapp and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2017, p. 12) 
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Timeline Migration Policy Changes Sweden  
April 2010 “In April 2010, new rules for family member immigration were introduced 
- requiring labour migrants from non-EEA countries who have had a 
permanent residence permit for less than four years to be able to support 
themselves and have adequate housing if they want their family to join 
them from abroad. 
> The financial support requirement demands that the sponsor, i.e. the 
person already staying in Sweden, must be able to support themselves and 
have housing of adequate size and standard for themselves and the alien. 
However, there are several exceptions to this requirement, such as if the 
applicant is a child.” 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
August 1st, “Since 1 August 2010, asylum seekers are allowed to work from  
2010 the first day they arrive in Sweden if they prove their identity.  
> The aim is to make it easier for asylum seekers to enter the job market 
after their application have been granted” 
Less Restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
September 1st, “On 1 September 2010, Sweden introduced a law - enabling municipalities  
2010 to pay a performance-based bonus to newly arrived immigrants who 
complete their studies in Swedish for Immigrants  
with a pass grade within 12 months.” 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
October 7th, “On 7 October 2010, a new law on civic orientation for new arrivals  
2010 was introduced - guaranteeing a minimum of 60 hours of civic orientation.  
> The municipalities are responsible for delivering civic orientation  
which aims to give the participants knowledge of human rights and basic 
democratic values, individual rights and responsibilities, how society is 
organised, and practical aspects of everyday life. Civic orientation shall  
be delivered in a language that the new arrival understands” 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2010 “Act on the introduction of new arrivals entered into force on 1 December 
2010 - regulating for the first time reception activities and responsibilities 
in a single Act and gives the national level the responsibility for 
introduction of refugees, other people in need of protection who have a 
residence permit and their close relatives between the ages of 20 and 64 
who have applied for a residence permit within two years. Before, 
municipalities have been responsible and the introduction has been 
designed differently across the country. 
> The reform entails, among other things: 
• the Swedish Public Employment Service will have a coordinating 
responsibility for introduction activities; 
  - 49 - 
• the Swedish Public Employment Service and the newly arrived 
immigrant will together draw up an introduction plan including activities to 
facilitate and speed up the introduction of the newly arrived immigrant into 
working and community life. As a general rule, the activities contained in 
the introduction plan should correspond to a full-time programme and 
contain, at minimum, Swedish for immigrants, civic orientation and 
employment preparation activities.  
• a new benefit will be introduced that is the same for all newly arrived 
immigrants regardless of where in the country they live and is paid in 
connection with active participation in introduction activities 
• a new service provider – an ‘introduction guide’ – is to assist the newly 
arrived immigrant during the introduction period. The guide is an 
independent actor working for the Swedish Public Employment Service to 
support newly arrived immigrants in their search for work. 
Mmunicipalities however continue to be responsible for  offering civic 
orientation courses. Housing provision and initiatives for children in 
schools and pre-schools, for example, continue to be the responsibility of 
municipalities. The municipalities receive compensation from the state for 
these initiatives. “ 
Less Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2011 Students from outside the EU will have to pay for university studies in 
Sweden 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
2012 „EU “Return Directive” was transposed into Swedish law, which took 
effect on 1 May 
2012 - introducing “re-entry bans”. 
> Anybody who is refused entry into Sweden or ordered to leave and does 
not leave the country within a set period of time can be forbidden to enter 
the country again.” 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
January 2012 “In January 2012, the Swedish Migration Board introduced stricter 
requirements for employers recruiting workers from non-EU countries, in 
order to prevent abuse - Employers in certain sectors, for example, must 
now demonstrate their ability to pay the offered wages before a work 
permit is granted. 
> This applies for employers in sectors such as cleaning, hotel and 
restaurants, construction, trade, agriculture and forestry.” 
More Restrictive  
Source: (DEMIG, 2015) 
September 2013 „In September 2013, Sweden decided to grant all Syrian refugees  
staying or arriving in Sweden permanent residency” 
Less restrictive 
Source: (DEMIG, 2015), (Migrationsverket, 2019) 
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2015 A decision to relocate “people who applied for asylum in Greece  
or Italy were relocated to Sweden” in 2017 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Ministry of Justice, 2018, p. 1) 
November 12th Temporary border controls; “the decision has been extended several  
2015 times and currently applies until 11 November 2019” Border controls  
on the Öresund bridge in order to reduce the number of persons  
applying for asylum. 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Ministry of Justice, 2019, p. 1), (Migrationsverket, 2019),  
(Parusel, 2017) 
October and Government announced measures that should reduce the amount of  
November 2015 people coming to Sweden: First, access to the Swedish territory with  
the purpose of seeking refuge; second, the granting of refuge and its legal 
consequences; third, the promotion and support of voluntary returns as  
well as the implementation of deportations of declined asylum seekers. 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Parusel, 2017) 
First half   Implementation of these changes from 2015 
of 2016  More Restrictive 
Source: (Parusel, 2017) 
January 2016 “bus, train and ferry companies are no longer allowed to carry  
passengers without identity documents from neighbouring  
Denmark or Germany to Sweden” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Parusel, 2016c) 
January 4th Temporary ID checks; no longer since May 2017 
2016   More Restrictive 
Source: (Ministry of Justice, 2018, p. 1), (Migrationsverket, 2019), 
(Regeringen och Regeringskansliet, 2017) 
March 2016 “In March 2016, weekly arrivals were only about 5%  
of those recorded in early November 2015” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Parusel, 2016c) 
March 1st  “A joint responsibility for receiving newcomers to the country,  
2016 draft legislation 2015:33. All municipalities are compelled to  
receive a portion of the refugees. 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Migrationsverket, 2019) 
June 1st 2016 “Change in the Reception of Asylum Seekers Act (LMA), etc. An asylum 
seeker who has received a negative response to his/her asylum application 
loses the right to aid if he/she does not leave the country voluntarily.  
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An asylum seeker who has received a definitive decision stating that he/she 
is to be expelled or deported loses the right to a daily allowance, and to 
asylum accommodation paid for by the Swedish Migration Agency. 
Families with children under 18 will still have the right to aid until  
they leave Sweden.” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Migrationsverket, 2019) 
July 20th 2016 „A temporary act was introduced bringing Sweden’s asylum rules  
in line with minimum standards under EU law” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Ministry of Justice, 2018, p. 1), (Migrationsverket, 2019),  
(Parusel, 2017) 
July 20th 2016 “Persons eligible for subsidiary protection are given a 13-month permit. 
Those who receive a 13-month residence permit as persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection do not have the right of family reunification. If  
the reasons for the person’s protection remain valid when the residence 
permit expires, he or she may apply for an extended residence permit.  
(This change is temporary.)“ 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Migrationsverket, 2019) 
July 20th 2016 “In previous legislation, all persons in need of protection generally 
received a permanent residence permit. Now, everyone who applies  
for and is given asylum receives a temporary residence permit” 
Valid until July 2019 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Migrationsverket, 2019) 
July 20th 2016 Possibility of family reunions has also been reduced. Only for people with 
refugee status, they receive a three-year permit “it is also necessary for the 
family to have a residence of sufficient size and of adequate standard. 
However, the maintenance requirement does not apply if the person  
with the connection is a child” 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Migrationsverket, 2019) 
2016 1900 people were resettled in 2016; in the next years, this number 
increased even further 
More Restrictive 
Source: (Ministry of Justice, 2018, p. 2) 
 
